I believe the default configuration for suspected spam and phishing and other malicious sites is that the user gets a red warning page that they have to click through first. Website owner would either get notifications from users or notice the drop off in traffic?
[–] Aachen 1 day ago
[–] JdeBP 1 day ago
Running anti-virus scanners immediately on uploaded files was a widespread practice in the BBS Era, adopted in response to the same kind of abuse. FTP sites did it, too. There was usually a delay for (run on a schedule) virus scanning between uploading to one of the shareware FTP sites and the file getting out of the upload directory and into the download areas.
The headlined article isn't really about hosting user-uploaded files, though. In no sensible system do user-uploaded files go straight into the site's own published JavaScript. The headlined situation is not analogous either to you or to BBSes, involving script hyperlinks to defunct third parties in one form of the problem, so what to do when it comes bad uploads from users is really going off on a tangent from Scott Helme's actual question.
[–] Aachen 7 hours ago
Maybe it works to stop 90% of the reports though. It is worth considering, just a pain. Also because I used it for getting malware onto lab machines when I was investigating their network traffic patterns for my bachelor's thesis, I'd have had to constantly work around such an antivirus. If people would just not try to find other people's files by url guessing, they'd also not be upset by them
[–] wakaru44 23 hours ago
[–] CoastalCoder 6 hours ago
You may want to meet with a marriage counselor.
[–] smallerize 10 hours ago
[–] nolist_policy 8 hours ago
[–] Aachen 7 hours ago
[–] usr1106 10 hours ago
Can anybody tell me it's not that bad?
[–] basscomm 9 hours ago
[–] ModernTimes 1 day ago
This is an incredibly brave thing to do in 2026.
[–] Aachen 1 day ago
[–] eastbound 1 day ago
Sorry mate, the era of forums is over.
[–] Aachen 1 day ago
[–] globalnode 1 day ago
[–] bingo-bongo 5 hours ago
[–] rustcleaner 1 day ago
A State might be composed of humans but it is a machine, a generally unthinking machine, which projects force on and breaks individuals.
[–] Mithriil 6 hours ago
[–] SamInTheShell 1 day ago
[–] IanCal 6 hours ago
[–] deepsun 1 day ago
UPDATE: Unpopular because it means there's a lot of work for the owner to moderate the files. And large sites like facebook are notorious for very bad moderation. It's not like we mandate them to hire N moderators per M users.
[–] SamInTheShell 1 day ago
There's a middle ground for this though. Platforms like Youtube, Facebook, etc, have no excuse anymore. They can literally scan with these models they have available and handle it. So write the legislation based on their capacity so you don't screw the one dude just trying to support some indie game devs in a small community or something.
[–] criddell 1 day ago
You've unwittingly helped to spread malware to an innocent person, so yes, it is your problem.
When somebody reports that you are spreading malware, what do you do with that information?
[–] Aachen 1 day ago
So far as I can tell, the malware uploaded to my site is when people use it as a virtual usb stick; transferring files to a lab system or something else they already have access to. A multiplayer remote desktop site was popular for a while, loads of links to shared virtual machines and sometimes people would upload screen recordings of something that happened (usually social things like someone saying something edgy in a chat that runs alongside). Since it's a lab environment, the users enjoy letting loose all sorts of malware and they'd use my site to get it there, but they always already had access or you can't type in the URL and execute the file
There was one instance where someone did make a self-spreading piece of malware, custom for my site. It would try to occupy a lot of short links, so pretty much no matter what you guessed, you'd end up finding that Windows executable and, if you ran it, it would upload itself to create yet more valid download links. Didn't do anything malicious to infected machines, just a nuisance to the site until I banned IP addresses that continued to spam the site
Of course, that's just focusing on the malware. The vast majority of uploads are screenshots, legit software (matching sha2sum with a known good source), long links or commands someone would otherwise have to type over, stuff like that. On occasion there's waves where some community will decide to use it for something, like rich Koreans sharing chatroom links for about a year comes to mind. A few teachers use it for very short temporary links that they can write on the chalkboard/whiteboard for students to download coursework from. It was down for 2h last week due to a power outage and one of my old teachers opened a github ticket about it, that was nice to see :)
[–] LoganDark 1 day ago
Are you talking about CollabVM? :)
[–] Aachen 7 hours ago
[–] phyzome 1 day ago
Primary obligation is to the users, not the owners of websites that got themselves infected.
[–] bragr 1 day ago
[–] baby_souffle 1 day ago
Better than a customer telling you they got a nasty bug from your site!
[–] citizenpaul 1 day ago
When I showed and asked who maintains her site, she said it regard to the malware, "All sites look like this"
That was when it hit me. They have won. The web is so full of garbage to the average person that they cannot even recognize it as it feeds on them.
The webadmin is some Chinese guy on upwork.
[–] xg15 6 hours ago
[–] queenkjuul 2 hours ago
[–] xg15 6 hours ago
What exactly would be "responsible" about that?
How is that better than just directly publishing the entire list?
[–] warkdarrior 1 day ago
[–] bartread 1 day ago
[–] Aachen 1 day ago
Most vendors of such lists don't have a contact method, don't respond, or say they're only aggregating a set of secret sources and it's up to me to look for those. Only a handful will actually respond to requests to re-evaluate the allegation, and remove you if it was/is false
[–] sublinear 1 day ago
> Supply chain - a third-party script file that a site loads is infected with malware, and is then loaded on to the site, exposing all visitors.
I already know many will disagree, but this is far too vague for your answer to make much sense. The list of 15k websites isn't given.
Most websites have at least one analytics script. Some of the biggest vendor names in that space have known XSS issues via nonce reuse that they aren't going to fix because it threatens their entire business model.
You usually get the whole clown car as soon as you allow one 3rd-party script for relatively innocent use cases like wanting a heatmap of user interaction.
You should fully expect that such a blacklist would take out most, if not all, of the websites you use every day. The security model for 3rd party scripts tends to be "trust me bro, we're $bigname"
[–] phyzome 1 day ago
[–] sublinear 1 day ago
The blame game isn't going to solve this. Blaming it entirely on the website owners/maintainers is only treating the symptoms instead of the disease.
[–] phyzome 1 day ago
[–] sublinear 1 day ago
[–] jeremyjh 5 hours ago
[–] sublinear 4 hours ago
Hardly anyone ever thinks about this despite it being a gaping hole. For all the whining I've ever heard about package managers like npm, this one is even uglier and likely being exploited right now. Its dynamic behavior is by design making it very hard to reliably demonstrate when it's being exploited, but it's a hole nonetheless.
It's perfectly actionable to stop using 3rd party scripts the way I outlined in a reply to a sibling comment. I'm not sure what else you need me to say.
It's very simple. Don't open up your web server's content security policy to domains that you "trust" just because a big name company tells you to. The only rub is that it directly contradicts all the instructions every analytics/ad provider gives for their scripts. Is that the real reason why you're saying it's "not actionable"?
[–] renehsz 1 day ago
[–] sublinear 1 day ago
The scripts should be 100% static files hosted by the same origin and not be obfuscated. These scripts should not make additional requests to inject even more scripts that cannot be known until run time and are specific to that targeted visitor. These scripts should be released in the usual semver tradition with matching hashes that never change without the explicit action by the same domain that the user actually visited (making the nonce obsolete).
Like I said, this is a very old debate with a very simple solution whose only problem is that it breaks the business model of a multi-billion dollar idea. Not only would this tighten up security, but your favorite websites wouldn't lag so hard anymore either. The vast majority of complaints about the web being slow are from the dozens of HTTP requests constantly being made behind your back. This is exactly why so many users feel forced to use an adblocker even though that doesn't always work.
[–] telebub 1 day ago
[–] Catloafdev 1 day ago
I'm not sure what point you're trying to make here.
[–] treadmill 1 day ago
I would agree with that.
[–] jeremyjh 5 hours ago
[–] sublinear 3 hours ago
This is not necessarily malicious behavior nor incompetence, unless you consider putting ads on a website incompetence. This problem has been festering for well over a decade.
The correct answer is probably the abuse contact shown in the WHOIS data. That's programmatically accessible and thus scales