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points by skybrian 1 day ago | 0 comments
What about when market prices are public? Is knowing the market prices collusion?
[–] omgwtfbyobbq 1 day ago
It can be, if everyone also acts to keep prices high by behaving in ways that aren't typical.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacit_collusion

[–] markasoftware 1 day ago
Reminds me of the extremely interesting paper https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234 Flash Boys 2.0

Basically when somebody makes a pricing error on a decentralized cryptocurrency exchange there's a mob of automated arbitrage bots that try to trade against it. Who wins and actually gets to make the trade is mainly determined by how high of a transaction fee your bot is willing to pay.

You can win instantly by offering to trade with a transaction fee so high it almost wipes out all but a cent or two of the entire arbitrage profits, because nobody else will pay a higher fee.

Instead what happens is bots offer the lowest possible fee, then immediately increase their fee as soon as they see a competing bot try to take the trade with a higher fee. This results in the bot offering the highest fee changing every several milliseconds as the fee quickly grows.

The way Ethereum mining works, this results in the winning bot being randomly selected from among the set of bots "bidding" up the transaction fee: blocks are mined at random intervals of iirc about 20 seconds, and whoever had the highest bid at the time the next block is mined wins. <20 seconds of bidding is short enough that even with the bidding, the transaction fee doesn't get bid up particularly high, and the winner makes out with a highly profitable arbitrage trade.

By giving up a guaranteed win and instead rolling the dice against other bots, transaction fees stay low and everyone has a higher expected profit. It's coordination that happens without any communication between the participants and quite possibly the participants didn't realize they were in effect cooperating when they added the high speed bidding behavior to their bots.

[–] JumpCrisscross 1 day ago
> You can win instantly by offering to trade with a transaction fee so high it almost wipes out all but a cent or two of the entire arbitrage profits, because nobody else will pay a higher fee

This is like 1980s sawtooth algos in real finance.

A lot of crypto is former HF folks taking old strategies to a dumber field.

[–] consensus1 21 hours ago
I have really enjoyed watching crypto act like they are white knights against the evil traditional financial system and then go on to reinvent it piece by piece.
[–] 59percentmore 20 hours ago
You're assuming that the contention was with the functionality and not with who controlled it.
[–] mrtesthah 17 hours ago
The current players in crypto are the same people. And there’s noting systematic about crypto that changes this — people with money can afford to buy more mining capacity or stake more coins.
[–] lotsofpulp 18 hours ago
There’s nothing evil about aiming to earn a penny or a fraction of a penny on a transaction.
[–] JumpCrisscross 13 hours ago
There is something evil, however, about scaremongering around fractions of a penny to convince folks to move money to one where the spread is several percent.
[–] malfist 17 hours ago
Who pays that penny?
[–] lotsofpulp 17 hours ago
Whoever wants to pay an extra penny. Like any other transaction.
[–] sandworm101 20 hours ago
That isnt cooperation. That is basic market principals in action. Bid and counter bids that whittle down the profit margin based on willingness to risk a win/loss? These are auction principals as old as time. This is reaction rather than cooperation.
[–] markasoftware 12 hours ago
The winner of the auction is not based on "willingness to risk a win/loss". The auction always ends at an absurdly low price because of the mechanics of the bidding, none of the participants ever drop out, because the price never goes above what they're willing to pay. Please read my comment or the paper again, this is not like an ebay auction at all.

For example, imagine a car auction that lasts only 20 seconds, with a random delay of up to 1 second, and with a very small minimum bid increment, say 2 cents, and no bidding fee or limit on number of bids. Now image 5 different people each outbidding each other by the minimum bid increment every 10 milliseconds. The price will climb by about $2/second, so by the end of auction, the winner will get the car for $40. Because everyone's bidding so fast, and nobody knows exactly when the auction will end, the winner is effectively random. At least on an expected value basis, this is highly beneficial to the participants vs actually bidding up to the true price of the car until other participants are not willing to bid anymore.

[–] rahimnathwani 1 day ago
Tacit collusion wouldn't work in this case, because most rental markets aren't oligopolies.
[–] hluska 15 hours ago
On its own? Of course not. Collusion is much more specific a term than that.