31 points by tharun208 1 day ago | 7 comments
[–] tharun208 1 day ago
[–] touristtam 1 day ago
I thought it was common practice to keep a machine that one wipe clean after each interview.
[–] nxtfari 1 day ago
In this day and age this is a bit like bringing a knife to a biocybernetic nanomaterial mimic fight. You will have much better results, with all untrusted software atp, instead of putting trust in a regex filter, asking any recent AI agent “I’m about to clone this repo, can you scan it for anything malicious/suspicious, phone-homes, possible hidden payloads, or secret update/c&c pathways?”
Even that is not guaranteed to keep you safe depending on the model used and the sophistication of the malware, but you’ll at least have a much better chance than a filtering tool. I am not being HN-paranoia-brained when I say it is the bare minimum for installing any software that comes from someone else, Github or an easily-compromised supply chain today.
[–] chinathrow 1 day ago
> It’s an npm install script or a .vscode/tasks.json task that runs the moment you open the folder.
WTF. Is that really a thing?
autorun.inf called, it wants their method back.
[–] rsoto2 1 day ago
How about we don't run code we do not trust. There is enough rogue code running around on a laptop. Also, to people making interviewees run untrusted code, give a 3rd party desktop access, why don't you imbeciles figure out how to TALK to people and look at their experience and figure out a hiring process like any regular business not run by inept anti-environment, anti-human psychopathic CEOs. It's really not that hard to discuss pseudocode, discuss project history and design, and figure out someone's problem solving skills.
[–] bandie91 1 day ago
cool, now they know how to hide better.
why not improve tooling on how to run untrusted code in isolated environments? this covers wider range of applicable situations.
[–] tomhow 1 day ago
Please don't post shallow dismissals on HN. The guidelines make it clear we're trying for something better here. https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
In these attacks the payload is often not the app itself. It’s an npm install script or a .vscode/tasks.json task that runs the moment you open the folder. So CloneGuard looks for exactly that kind of thing.
It’s a single Go binary with no dependencies, and it is read-only. It never runs, installs or imports anything from the project.
cloneguard clone https://github.com/someone/demo-app cloneguard scan ./some-folder
What it flags:
reads of SSH keys, cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure, kube), browser data, wallets connections to raw IPs, webhooks, pastebins, tunnels download-and-run patterns (eval, curl | sh) auto-run hooks (npm scripts, VS Code tasks, setup.py) obfuscated code and committed binaries
A file that both reads secrets and talks to a suspicious server is escalated to “critical”. Exit codes (0-3) make it easy to drop into a script or git hook. The demo/ folder has a deliberately malicious sample you can try it on.
Limitations: it’s regex and heuristic based, so a determined attacker can evade it, and legitimate code (a password manager, for instance) can trigger false positives. “Clean” doesn’t mean safe. For code from strangers, still use a throwaway VM.
I’d love feedback on techniques it misses, false positives you hit, and rules you’d want added.