I feel like the industry hasn't solved that alignment problem yet... We have no way to verify the entire models landscape of intent.
Paid models have an incentive not to do that because if the market discovers it there is a huge economy penalty, but the free open source models don't have that disincentive.
[–] neya 1 day ago
[–] FloorEgg 1 day ago
What exactly are you claiming is false about my statement?
The list you presented are mistakes Anthropic made or cases when they put their own interests ahead of users, but I don't see how it disproves the point I was making. None of those are examples of embedding backdoors or stealing secrets to take over or sabotage a system. They are categorically different than what I'm asking about.
[–] Catloafdev 1 day ago
This just fundamentally isn't true. They run on the same economic model, but they have to release the weights to gain credibility, unlike the American labs.
> Do you ever worry whether these open source models have been trained to embed backdoors or leak secrets in very specific circumstances at some point in the future?
Open weight models are extensively analyzed. It is extremely unlikely there is an intentional 'backdoor when X' concept added to any of them. Not impossible, but unlikely for the same economic incentives you see in the other labs, and given that no evidence of anything along those lines has surfaced yet.
[–] ericmay 1 day ago
In my opinion, to suggest open-weight models are extensively analyzed while being net new and continuously released and the model itself being unintelligible to humans seems a bit premature.
It's possible that closed-weight models end up following the pattern of being arguably less secure since there are fewer eyes on them analogous to open source software but I don't think there's a perfect match here.
[–] blocked_againnn 1 day ago
[–] UncleOxidant 1 day ago
[–] phendrenad2 1 day ago
[–] CamperBob2 1 day ago
... as long as the reviewer model hasn't been deliberately lobotomized, that is.
(I don't disagree with the [dead] comment, either -- fortunately I tend to make small changes to code I'm very familiar with, so it's fairly easy to vet in person. The more code gets generated by the clanker, the more nervous I get, just because it's impossible to keep some complacency from creeping in.)
[–] figassis 1 day ago
[–] scott_weber 1 day ago
Auditing output by contrast is a continuous cost. On the third hand, it's one that most will want to pay anyway.
The "embed into shipped code so subtly humans can't spot it" vector is sci fi ish. Less plausible than old fashioned trusting-trust issues, and most folks have managed to sleep at night for the last 40ish years that spectre has haunted.
[1] I guess the model could return output that buffer overflows the harness and exceeds its intended ability, but that seems far-fetched too
[–] jdjdjdjjdbznnx 1 day ago
just read the damn code yourself!
[–] hattmall 1 day ago
It's basically impossible to do this. Claude produces so much excessive / verbose code and comments that reading it would take far longer than simply doing the implementation "by hand". It's kind of like, Claude can write the code in 1/2 a day. It can be reviewed by another LLM, unit tested by another for 1 day. Or I could write the code in probably 3-4 days. Reading it and validating / testing it myself though would easily take 6+ days.
Now if I were fully in control I wouldn't run code that wasn't truly reviewed at all, but in the situations where Claude is being used that's not my call. TBH a lot gets caught, and I have some automated scripts that find a lot of the more problematic stuff automatically, flag it, send it back and make note for the reviewer model as well.
I will also spot check areas where I think an issue could arise.
False.
I worry more about Claude.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50387628