points by shakow 1 day ago | 0 comments
First you shouldn't have unwraps in prod code, and you can verify that in your CI/build process/whatever. Second, now you have a crash of the SSH server, which is arguably much better than some random logging in as root.
[–] kazinator 1 day ago
"you shouldn't have unwraps in production code" is exactly the same form of argument as "you shouldn't be assuming crypt returns a valid non-null pointer in production code".
[–] dadoum 22 hours ago
Absolutely not. Unwrap is a language rule, so everyone knows unwrap is not a safe thing to do and writing it even once is an explicit dismissal (and you should document it). On the other side, knowing that crypt does not necessarily return a hash is easily overlooked and forgotten, there is no code smell that can hint you that you are doing things wrong.
[–] shakow 1 day ago
I don't really care about the form of the argument when the concrete results are that (i) “no unwrap in prod” is trivial to ensure through the toolchain, (ii) even though, its consequences are “damn it crashed” instead of “welp I guess this guy is root now”.
[–] kazinator 3 hours ago
In this situation, the decisions to make crypt implementations stop returning null in favor of a string error token were made not because C programs that misuse crypt are difficult to fix, but because they are in the form of unknown binaries in the wild that you cannot fix.
And that analogous situation can happen in the safer language where crypt returns an Optional(String) which some bad programs assume is always present. You don't know where all such programs exist, and people use them who don't have the code and cannot fix them.
Returning an error token which is carefully different from crypt's second argument was an attempt to fix programs that cannot be hunted down, patched and recompiled, even if fixing them would be easy to do.
Of course the tooling for C pointers being null or not is not comparable to optional types; that's not debatable.
[–] f33d5173 1 day ago