[–] twoodfin 10 hours ago
[–] tristanj 10 hours ago
Regardless, the treaties are strategically irrelevant since China is a non-signatory and it has refused to sign on to a joint arms control agreement.
[–] vkou 17 minutes ago
Why is its non-involvement relevant, but the non-involvement of Israel, Pakistan, India isn't?
[–] twoodfin 9 hours ago
[–] kryogen1c 9 hours ago
It should be noted that a missle designed with a removable component requiring 30 seconds of install time does not count as an active missle when not assembled.
[–] bunabhucan 8 hours ago
[–] jakeydus 9 hours ago
[–] srean 9 hours ago
ANUS TART
Maybe that was your point.
It is a good idea to screen urls for alternative parses and tokenizations. For example
For my day job I had written such a tokenizer, so I do this almost automatically.
[–] Taniwha 6 hours ago
[–] icegreentea2 11 hours ago
https://www.warren.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/
https://www.warren.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Artic...
[–] eddyg 1 hour ago
[–] dist-epoch 10 hours ago
[–] derektank 10 hours ago
[–] stockresearcher 2 days ago
[–] Avshalom 11 hours ago
[–] Peanuts99 10 hours ago
[–] dist-epoch 10 hours ago
[–] cucumber3732842 6 hours ago
[–] _kb 8 hours ago
[–] kotaKat 7 hours ago
"The Safeguards Transport program is so secretive that only three photographs of the unknown number of vehicles have been publicly released."
... here's quite a few hundred more (moving) photographs of them! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8yLYLSzoIw
[–] ceejayoz 10 hours ago
https://www.reddit.com/r/gifs/comments/6macxc/casually_reare...
[–] 1123581321 5 hours ago
[–] rdtsc 1 minute ago
[–] thayne 10 hours ago
Transporting a nuclear warhead is probably safer. I'm sure there are tons of safeguards to prevent an accidental detonation, and with a military escort people are more likely to be drive carefully around you.
[–] beloch 9 hours ago
[–] rbanffy 9 hours ago
[–] rsynnott 9 hours ago
Also, of course, even assuming that it’s ‘safe’, spreading one over the landscape is extremely undesirable.
(Also if it was an actual missile as described, you _definitely_ do not want one of those solid fuel motors going up.)
These give the US and Russian governments what are supposed to be adequate inspection regimes to count the number of active missiles, but of course make no requirement on the signatories to make it easy to locate all the missiles at any given moment.
So there’s a strong strategic incentive to shuffle them around between treaty-mandated inspections.